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first volume, the quality of Mr. Harmon's version will more than justify its existence. It is quite as readable and racy as that of the Fowlers, and, as befits a Loeb translation, follows the text more closely than their purpose required them to do. Mr. Harmon is generally very happy in rendering idiom by idiom, and technicality by technicality; his descriptions vie with the original in aptness and variety of phrase, and in the turning of scabrous passages he exhibits a periphrastic ingenuity worthy of a purer cause. The explanatory and critical notes, though brief, are helpful, to the point, and up to date, and will make this edition of value even to scholars. Mr. Harmon evidently knows his Lucian. Errors and oversights are very few. I give what I believe to be a nearly complete list of his mistaken or disputable renderings:

Lapiths 26: *πρὸς χάριν αὐτῷ σύνεστιν* is not "likes to be with him" but is an indulgent (over-complaisant) tutor; cf. Demosthenes' *πρὸς χάριν δημηγορεῖν*.

Ibid. 28: *οὐδ' ἂν ἐμπαρασχεῖν ἑαυτὸν τοιούτῳ τινί* does not refer to Aristaenetus but to Hetoemocles, and means not "he would not expose himself to any such treatment," but "he, the philosopher, would not condescend to [take part in] such [a festivity]."

Ibid. 30: *ὅπως πρεσβυτικάι*, not "how senile" but, ironically, "how worthy of an elder."

A True Story i. 32: *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἤδη ἐθάδες τῇ διατριβῇ ἐγενόμεθα*, not "when we finally tired of this pastime," but rather "when we had become wonted to the place."

Ibid. ii. 1: *τῇ μονῇ* is, of course, not "loneliness" but "delay."

Ibid. ii. 7: *πίομενον* is, of course, not aorist "after taking a dose of hellebore," but future. The hellebore is a part of the treatment to be given by Hippocrates.

Ibid. ii. 23: *καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον ἄτρεπτος ἦν*, not "kept his face to the front," but "did not change color or countenance."

Phalaris i. 4: *καὶ σὺν φθόνῳ καματηρόν*, not "when attended by jealousy; a burden," but "both burdensome and invidious."

Dionysius 7: *φωνή τε λαμπρά* is not quite "a splendid flow of language."

Heracles 4: *φιλόσοφος οἶμαι τὰ ἐπιχώρια* is rather "learned in local antiquities and mythology" than a "scholar from the native standpoint."

PAUL SHOREY

Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles.

VON DR. WERNER WILHELM JAEGER. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1912. M. 5.

It is not certain that Aristotle's *Metaphysics* as it stands is more badly composed than the second part of *Wilhelm Meister*. But Goethe has told us how *Wilhelm Meister* was eked out and filled up to meet the demand for

additional copy. For the composition of the *Metaphysics* we have no such revelations. We do not know how much of it Aristotle intended to make part of a consecutive treatise, how much he may have interpolated or added from earlier or later lectures, or lastly what detached papers his editors may have arranged under the comprehensive rubric τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, the things after physics.

These are the problems which Dr. Jaeger undertakes to solve by sheer force of philological analysis. The little book A *ἐλαττον* is apparently an introduction to general physics, and its omission does not break the connection between Books A and B. Book Δ, a specimen of a lexicon of equivocal philosophical terms, could be easily spared, and the apparent cross-references to it in other books may, like other cross-references in the Aristotelian treatises, be kept or explained away according to the exigencies of the interpreter's thesis. There is, however, *pace* Dr. Jaeger, no necessity for dropping this book. Aristotle is at any time liable to digress on his favorite topic of πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα. And as all metaphysics is largely an abuse of equivocal terms, we need not scrutinize too closely the artistic relevancy of a special book on the subject in a metaphysical treatise. Whenever inserted, it would seem to interrupt the continuous argument. It would be an appropriate but very dry and unimpressive introduction to the whole work, and placed at the end it would be an anticlimax.

Similar considerations pro and con apply to Book I, which treats of the one and the many and the ideas of opposition and difference—traditional topics of metaphysics already in Plato. The first part of Book K reads like either a résumé or a preliminary sketch of BTE. Doctor Jaeger accounts for the peculiarities of the style and the un-Aristotelian use of γε μὴν by the hypothesis that it is a student's notes of an independent shorter course of lectures. "Wie oft wird Aristoteles über Metaphysik gelesen haben." Perhaps. But this chapter is a striking illustration of the superiority of negative over affirmative arguments in these uncertain matters. Dr. Jaeger's twenty-page refutation of Natorp's theory that K 1-8 is spurious and Platonic is the best piece of reasoning in his entire book. Nearly every point is well taken, and his interpretations of the text against Natorp are in nearly every instance, I believe, right, and are usually supported, I may add, by the excellent translation of Ross. The second part of K, chaps. ix to xii, is an extract sometimes almost verbatim from the *Physics*. Book Δ in its main content seems to crown the edifice by connecting the abstract ontology of the metaphysics with the prime mover of the *de caelo* on the one hand, and the self-thinking νοῦς of the *de anima* on the other. But the interrelations of these ideas are so confused and tentative in statement that, despite the immense historical influence of the book, it is quite possible to deny that Aristotle really intended to complete his system on these lines. Furthermore, the style of the book is in many places that of memoranda or excerpted notes, while in others it rises to religious eloquence. It is open to

argue, then, that we have here notes of an early work never really intended for this place, or that, on the contrary, the book is the unfinished sketch of a final philosophy which Aristotle was either unable or unwilling to complete. In any case, if *Λ* as it stands concludes the main metaphysical argument, Books *M* and *N*, which deal minutely with the history of and the polemic against the doctrine of ideas and ideal numbers, must be either a gross anticlimax or an appendix.

Dr. Jaeger is certain that these last two books could not have been intended for their present place. He explains away the anticipatory references to them in 1037 *a* 10, and 1042 *a* 22, and sets up the thesis that together with Book *I* they belong in the main series of metaphysical lectures instead of *ZH*Θ, which have usurped their place. His thesis rests on an exaggeration of the degree and kind of consistency to be expected in a metaphysical treatise which I have no space to controvert. I can only test its application in this place. His first argument is that Books *ZH*Θ treat of *αἰσθητῇ οὐσίᾳ*, which Books *MN* regard as belonging to physics, not metaphysics. He writes (p. 110): "Dass Aristoteles *M*. 1, 1076 *a* 6 f. und *M*. 9, 1086 *a* 21 f. nicht so sprechen konnte, wie er es tut, wenn *Z*-Θ vorhergingen, bestreitet weder Brandis noch Bonitz, noch ist es überhaupt bestreitbar." Let us see. Book *M* begins (1076 *a* 1): "We have discussed the *οὐσία* of *αἰσθητά* in respect to their matter or potentiality in the physics and in respect to their energy [actualization or form], later." What is meant by "later"? Translators and commentators generally refer it to *ZH*Θ, and they are probably right. At any rate, in *Z* 11, 1037 *a* 10 ff. Aristotle tells us that the purpose of his analysis of the relation of matter and form in *αἰσθητὰ οὐσίαι* is to prepare the way for the discussion of the problematical existence of other kinds of *οὐσίαι* wholly beside and independent of matter. For, he adds, the study of *αἰσθητῇ οὐσίᾳ* belongs in a fashion to physical and secondary philosophy. Aristotle then recognizes this fact as clearly in *Z* as in *M*. The absolute separation of physics and metaphysics which Dr. Jaeger seems to demand was no more possible for Aristotle than it is for us, and there is no reason for postulating a main series of metaphysical lectures from which all consideration of *αἰσθητὰ οὐσίαι* was excluded.

In 1086 *a* 21 the matter is still plainer. Dr. Jaeger overlooks the limiting word *μόνης*, with which cf. *μόνον*, in 989 *b* 22. Aristotle says in effect: "The opinions about first principles, causes, and elements of those who discuss only *αἰσθητῇ οὐσίᾳ* have partly been set forth in the *Physics* and in part do not belong to the present method." Those who discuss *only αἰσθητῇ οὐσίᾳ* are clearly the materialistic pre-Socratics, who are considered not only in the *Physics*, but in the historical review in the first book of the *Metaphysics*, where it is also said that they pertain properly to physics (989 *b* 21-3). They of course do not belong to a "method" especially reserved for the study of alleged immaterial ideas and numbers. But Dr. Jaeger is hardly justified in first referring the designation *τῆς μεθόδου τῆς νῦν* to the whole

subject of first philosophy, and then assuming that the exclusion of pre-Socratic materialists from metaphysics here is incompatible with Aristotle's discussion elsewhere in the *Metaphysics* of the problem of matter and form in *αἰσθητὰ οὐσία* or his treatment in *Λ* of the "divine" *αἰσθητὴ οὐσία* of the heavenly bodies and the spiritual powers that move their spheres. Aristotle himself tells us, on the contrary, that the aim of *σοφία* is to explain *τὰ φανερά*, and his chief objection to Platonism is that its assumption of immaterial *οὐσία* contributes nothing to such an explanation (992 *a* 24 ff.). More weighty is the casual suggestion that the topics of ZH@ are rather the preparation for, than the main body of, a metaphysical system. But the answer to this is that all metaphysics and especially the metaphysics of Aristotle consist mainly of introductions and preparations and false starts and recapitulations.

A final proof of the impossibility of admitting ZH@ in the same series with *Λ* and MN is said to be that Z regards the ideas as not yet refuted whereas they have been explicitly refuted in *Λ* 8-9. But every reader is aware that Aristotle always regards the ideas as sufficiently refuted for a sneer (*τερεῖσματα*) and sufficiently an open question for a renewal of the assault upon them. Z regards the ideas as unrefuted only in the sense that it keeps returning to the attack, and this is almost equally true of MN. I am not arguing for the retention of MN in their present place, but only against the throwing-out of ZH@ on insufficient grounds. I do not think that we have evidence enough to determine the history of MN; but what we have points to them as an appendix especially reserved for the more detailed discussion of ideas and numbers.

The numerous repetitions and awkward transitions in the *Metaphysics* supply Dr. Jaeger with material for a great many more ingenious minor combinations which it would require a volume as large as his own to test. There is a certain plausibility in the general assumption that variant doublets represent substituted or alternative lectures in repeated courses. But he often finds such doublets where we probably have nothing more than the natural self-repetition of a hurried metaphysician possessed of some fixed ideas, but uncertain of his goal. Twice in *Λ* 7 Aristotle triumphantly proclaims that the pre-Socratics had suggested no idea of cause not included in his own classification. There is nothing surprising, then, in the recurrence of this complacent remark in *Λ* 10. By *ἀπορίαι* Aristotle sometimes means objections to the systems he is criticizing and sometimes the problems which they suggest for his own thought. His use of the word supplies no basis for theories of the construction of the *Metaphysics*. He is at any time capable of using the same word in different senses in the same paragraph. There are few writers whose style will less bear pressing by the rigor of philological logic.

But though I am unable to share Dr. Jaeger's confidence in the power of pure philological analysis to reconstruct with certainty the composition of

the *Metaphysics*, no student of Aristotle can fail to derive a great deal of instruction and stimulus from his close grappling with the many problems presented by the text as it stands. Especially interesting is the second part, entitled "Die literarische Stellung und Form der *Metaphysik*," which is elaborated, evidently under the influence of von Wilamowitz, into something like a systematic history of the delivery and publication of professional lectures in antiquity.

PAUL SHOREY

Sophistik und Rhetorik. Das Bildungsideal des εὖ λέγειν in seinem Verhältnis zur Philosophie des V. Jahrhunderts. Von H. GOMPERZ. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912. Pp. vi+292. M. 10.

The writer, who must be distinguished from his father, the author of *Greek Thinkers*, has chosen for his special domain the border-land of philosophy, rhetoric, and sophistic in the fifth and fourth centuries. The main thesis of the present volume is that sophistic was in its essence rhetoric—the theory and practice of the art εὖ λέγειν—and that all philosophic, scientific, or other special interests which modern historians of philosophy attribute by tradition to the fifth-century Sophists are to be taken in strict subordination to this dominant end. In confirmation of this presumption, he undertakes a broad and somewhat prolix survey of the extant tradition as conveniently collected in Diels. Gorgias' treatise on *Nature or the Non-existent* is not a serious exposition of critical skepticism, but the maintenance of a paradoxical thesis in the style and the logical divisions of his *Praise of Helen* and his *Defence of Palamedes*, the genuineness of which Gomperz defends at length. Thrasymachus did not teach the ethical nihilism attributed to him by Plato. The famous fragment to the effect that the gods do not concern themselves with human affairs since men obviously make no use of justice must have been a mere jest of one of the ὑπερβάλλοντες or exaggerating discourses. The Thrasymachus of the first book of the *Republic* is merely a dramatic representative of an unknown contemporary attacked by Plato—the author of the *Clitophon* which Gomperz thinks was written about 390. This unknown writer, after there exposing the negative and unsatisfactory character of all Socratic definitions of justice, probably went on in a lost supplement to the *Clitophon* to develop as his own definition the formula which Plato attributes to Thrasymachus—that justice is the advantage of the stronger.

Antiphon the Sophist is to be distinguished from the orator. Though a student of Empedocles, he is not properly speaking a philosopher; he is the rhetorician of the elevated commonplace, as Gorgias is the rhetorician of the paradox. The predominance of the merely formal over the substantive interest in Hippias, the Anonymus of Iamblichus, and the *Dialexeis* is easily demonstrated. Prodicus' advanced course in synonyms was not a scientific